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COMMENTS
PERPICH V. UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. WHO
CONTROLS THE WEEKEND SOLDIER?
The framers of the United States Constitution avoided a ma-
jor drawback of the Articles of Confederation by creating a shared
power relationship between the states and the national govern-
ment.' This dynamic relationship, so often the source of great con-
' See THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 98 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); Amar, Of Sover-
eignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1442 (1987); see also 1 B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMEN-
TARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 10-13 (1963
& photo. reprint 1977) (framers sought to eliminate fundamental defects of government es-
tablished under Articles of Confederation). One major problem with the Articles of Confed-
eration (the "Articles") was that the Congress was too weak to enact and enforce laws of a
national character. See THE FEDERALIST No. 15, supra, at 91-93; 1 F. THORPE, THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 245-46 (1901 & photo. reprint 1970). In addition,
the Articles were flawed because:
They operated not on the people directly, affecting individuals, but on legislatures
representing the States as political corporations. The extent of their powers was
limited by whatever administration the legislature might give them. They did not
consolidate the people into a Nation. The extent of their authority, therefore, was
federal not national. They made provision for amendments, and Canada might
come into the Union.
Id. at 243-44. As a result of the weaknesses of the Articles, the new nation suffered many
problems. See id. at 245-56. See generally P. HAY & R. ROTUNDA, THE UNITED STATES FED-
ERAL SYSTEM: LEGAL INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 5-12 (1982) (discussion of
Congress' limited powers under Articles of Confederation and how framers attempted to
expand them).
To avoid the disadvantages of the Articles, the framers of the Constitution rejected a
confederate system of government, which would have allowed each state to retain its com-
plete sovereignty. See P. Du PONCEAU, A BRIEF VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 13-18 (1974). In its place, the framers constructed a system of government that
would not "deprive the states of more of their sovereignty and independence, than was nec-
essary to insure the permanency of the union." Id. at 14. The new government conferred
powers on the states, but limited them, and strengthened the powers of the national govern-
ment. See A. PUTNEY, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW 141-43 (1985); see
also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land"). The impor-
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troversy, has become dominated since the New Deal era by an in-
creasingly powerful national government.3 This dominance has
tance of national supremacy cannot be underestimated as this principle, "more than any-
thing else, ensures the effective functioning of the Union." 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra, at 38. "It
is that principle which prevents the Federal Government from becoming subordinate to the
states in the manner that had rendered the original Confederation so futile." Id. See gener-
ally A. PUTNEY, supra, at 134-45 (discussion of distribution of powers between states and
national government and concept of national supremacy).
I See K. HALL, FEDERALISM: A NATION OF STATES xi (1987). The continuing debate over
the concept of federalism, "a system of government under which there exists simultaneously
a federal or central government and several state governments," id. at ix, has been suc-
cinctly described as follows:
Americans during the past two-hundred years have debated incessantly the
issue of federalism, and perhaps no other concept, save judicial review, has stirred
more controversy. Much of this controversy has to do with states' rights. An im-
portant strain in American constitutional thought has held that the states, and
not the people are the basic units of sovereign authority. That notion began with
the Antifederalists' efforts to block ratification of the Constitution and continued
through the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of the late 1790s, the Nullification
Crisis of the early 1830s, the Secession Crisis of 1861, and the Massive Resistance
Movement of the late 1950s.
Id. at xi. Historically, this controversy has become more acute when the proponents of
states' rights have challenged the Supreme Court's authority to resolve conflicts of federal-
ism. See Schmidhauser, "States' Rights" and the Origin of the Supreme Court's Power as
Arbiter in Federal-State Relations, 4 WAYNE L. REV. 101, 101-02 (1958). The Supreme
Court's decisions which attempted to resolve federalism conflicts are among its most fa-
mous. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554-56 (1985)
(applying provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act to state employees does not violate divi-
sion of powers contained in Constitution); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
855 (1976) (Congress' commerce clause power could not be used to force state governments
into making particular policy choices) (overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 80 (1831) (states had no authority under Constitution
to interfere with federal treaties involving Indians); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) (Congress had power under "necessary and proper" clause to char-
ter national bank immune from state taxation); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 342 (1816) (Supreme Court could exercise appellate jurisdiction over federal
question decisions brought in state courts); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 425
(1793) (state could be sued by non-resident in federal court). See generally FEDERALISM:
THE SHIFTING BALANCE 1-13 (J. Griffith ed. 1989) (historical overview of changes in alloca-
tion of power between states and federal government).
' See Scheiber, American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power: Historical and Con-
temporary Perspectives, 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 619, 648-49 (1978). "Since the New Deal era, ...
the centralization of governmental functions, together with the augmented executive power.
•. has served to undermine the limitations upon the power of those who govern." Id. at 649.
Through Congress' use of its constitutional power derived from the commerce clause, the
national government has increased its dominance over the states. See 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. No-
WAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 4.8, at
290-91 (1986) [hereinafter SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE] (broad interpretation of congres-
sional power under commerce clause). The power granted by the commerce clause is "per-
haps the most important and conspicuous power possessed by the Federal Government."
See A. PUTNEY, supra note 1, at 384. Under the commerce clause, Congress has the power
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become particularly striking in military affairs.4 The power of the
"[tlo regulate Commerce ... among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The
importance of congressional power over commerce has increased significantly, primarily in
the area of interstate commerce. See A. PUTNEY, supra note 1, at 384-87. Prior to 1937, the
concept of "dual sovereignty" reserved certain powers to the states through the tenth
amendment. See 1 SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, supra, § 4.5, at 273-74; see also United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895) (dual sovereignty theory formerly held that
federal antitrust laws affected state regulated manufacturing combinations). In 1937, the
Court shifted to a more expansive interpretation of the commerce clause. See, e.g., United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (constitutional authority of Congress to prohibit
interstate shipment of goods produced in violation of Fair Labor Standards Act); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (Congress has power to control intra-
state activities "if they have such a close and substantial relationship to interstate com-
merce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens
and obstructions"). Under this view, the Court has largely deferred to Congress by holding
that any regulation is within the commerce clause power as long as it has a rational basis.
See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5.4, at 309 (2d ed. 1988). This radical
change was stimulated by the economic problems of the New Deal era and the pressures
presented by President Roosevelt's "Court Packing Plan." See 1 SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE,
supra, § 4.7, at 289-90. See generally Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power,
73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1443-54 (1987) (analysis of New Deal cases expanding scope of com-
merce clause).
Another major area in which federal power has expanded is in Congress' exercise of
power under the taxing and spending clause. See 1 SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, supra, § 5.7,
at 350. This clause provides that "Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the Common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. It was not until 1936
that the Supreme Court defined the scope of Congress' power under this clause. See 1 SUB-
STANCE AND PROCEDURE, supra, § 5.7, at 349-50. Under the Court's interpretation, the power
of Congress to spend public monies for public purposes is not restricted by the enumerated
powers of Congress. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936). For a recent case
examining Congress' power under the spending clause, see South Dak. v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
206-09 (1987) (valid exercise of congressional spending power to withhold federal highway
funds from states unless they raised drinking age to 21). See generally L. TRIBE, supra, §§
5.9-.10. (discussion of Congress' taxing and spending powers).
See Comment, The Constitution and the Training of National Guardsmen: Can
State Governors Prevent Uncle Sam from Sending the Guard to Central America?, 5 J.L. &
POL. 597, 603 (1988). The history of the military, particularly the National Guard (the
"Guard"), has been one of increasing federalization. Id. In Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57
(1981), the Court recognized Congress' dominant role in national defense and military af-
fairs and noted that "perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater
deference." Id. at 64-65; see also Kester, State Governors and the Federal National Guard,
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 177, 196 (1988) (brief discussion of congressional authority over
military affairs); Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARv. L. REV. 181, 182-
210 (1940) (chronological survey of parallel development of Regular Army and National
Guard through 1940).
The military power of Congress is derived from article I of the Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (power "[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,
and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water"); id at cl. 12 (power "[tlo raise
and support Armies"); id. at cl. 13 (power "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy"); id. at cl. 14
(power "[tlo make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces")
1989]
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national government in this realm has been described as "broad
and sweeping."5 Fearful of this broad and unchecked power, the
[hereinafter the preceding powers will be referred to collectively as the "army clauses
power"]; see also id. § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress.... keep
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace"). The President, by virtue of his office, is termed
the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of
the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States." Id. at art. II, §
2, cl. 1. See generally H. ROTTSCHAEFER, HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 184 (1939)
(overview of Congress' war and military powers under Constitution).
The powerful nature of the federal government's authority under the army clauses has
long been recognized. See, e.g., Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411-12 (1871) (state
judge without jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas corpus to discharge soldier in military
service of United States); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827) (President had
sole authority to determine necessity of calling militia). The federal government's expansive
power over the military was described as follows:
[A]mong the powers assigned to the National government, is the power "to raise
and support armies," and the power "to provide for the government and regula-
tion of the land and naval forces." The execution of these powers falls within the
line of its duties; and its control over the subject is plenary and exclusive. It can
determine, without question from any State authority, how the armies shall be
raised ....
Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 408 (emphasis added).
The modern expansion of the power of the federal government under the army clauses
occurred during the World War I era, when Congress aggressively exercised its plenary
power. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 164-68
(1919) (War-Time Prohibition Act was constitutional exercise of war powers of Congress
even though bill was enacted post-Armistice); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 387-
88 (1918) (power of Congress to compel military service under Selective Draft Law during
World War I was constitutional exercise of war powers). See generally C. MAY, IN THE NAME
OF WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR POWERS SINCE 1918, at 254-75 (1989) (historical
discussion and analysis of use of war powers to handle problems during and immediately
after World War I).
Since World War I, there have been numerous decisions exemplifying the broad lati-
tude of power conferred upon the national government by the army clauses. See, e.g., Chap-
pell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300-01 (1983) (Court noted the plenary power of Congress
under army clauses); Johnson v. Powell, 414 F.2d 1060, 1063-64 (5th Cir. 1969) (national
government's calling of National Guard during Vietnam War was constitutional under army
clauses); United States v. Fenno, 167 F.2d 593, 595 (2d Cir.), (statute which made member
of fleet reserve subject to naval laws while on inactive duty was constitutional as valid exer-
cise of congressional power under army clauses), cert. dismissed, 335 U.S. 806 (1948). There
are limitations, however, on these powers. See infra notes 33-62 accompanying text.
I United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). In O'Brien, the Court held that
there was a substantial governmental interest in preventing the burning of draft cards which
outweighed the defendant's right to engage in symbolic speech and was based in part on
Congress' "broad and sweeping" power to raise and support armies. Id. at 377-78. Justice
Douglas, in dissent, suggested that this broad power of Congress might exist only when
there is a declared war, and that this is "a question upon which the litigants and the coun-
try are entitled to a ruling." Id. at 389 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Holmes v. United
States, 390 U.S. 936 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting)); see also Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300-01
(Congress has plenary power over military forces of United States); Fenno, 167 F.2d at 595
(Congress has broad power to subject members of the reserve to military law). See generally
[Vol. 64:1:133
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framers authorized Congress to recognize a militia6 that was largely
controlled by the states.7 Throughout our history, the states gener-
ally have maintained control over the militia during times of
peace,' but not during war or national emergency.9 Recently, how-
infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text (discussion of broad nature of congressional power
under army clauses power and how power changes during wartime).
6 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. Congress has the power:
[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserv-
ing to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority
of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress ....
Id. (emphasis added). In addition, the Bill of Rights states that "[a] well regulated Militia
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms
shall not be infringed." Id. at amend. II.
The militia has evolved from a disorganized force consisting of all male citizens of fight-
ing age to an organized component of the United States defense system, known as the Na-
tional Guard. See Weiner, supra note 4, at 182, 195; see also Maryland ex rel Levin v.
United States, 381 U.S. 41, 46 ("National Guard is the modern Militia reserved to the
States"), vacated, 382 U.S. 159 (1965); Hirsch, The Militia Clauses of the Constitution and
the National Guard, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 914, 943-46 (1988) (discussion of history and devel-
opment of National Guard).
7 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. Pursuant to the constitutional command that
"training the Militia [be] according to the discipline prescribed by Congress" the federal
government regulates the training and equipment of the National Guard. See 32 U.S.C. §§
701-706 (1982). However, judicial decisions have recognized that the militia/National Guard
is fundamentally a state organization. See, e.g., Maryland ex rel Levin, 381 U.S. at 46-47
(National Guard officer while not in federal service is state official for Federal Tort Claims
Act purposes and federal government not liable for his negligence until Guard is federal-
ized); New Jersey Air Nat'l Guard v. FLRA, 677 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir.) (National Guard is
federal/state hybrid organization whose civilian employees are not subject to Federal Labor
Relations Act), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); Mela v. Callaway, 378 F. Supp. 25, 28
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (National Guard basically a state organization).
Each of the 50 state constitutions designates its respective governor as commander-in-
chief of the state's National Guard. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. VII ("gover-
nor shall be the commander-in-chief"); MINN. CONST. art. 5, § 3 ("[the governor] is com-
mander-in-chief of the military and naval forces and may call them out to execute the laws,
suppress insurrection and repel invasion"); N.Y. CONsT. art. 4, § 3 ("governor shall be com-
mander-in-chief of the military and naval forces of the state").
I See 32 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1982). The statute states: "Nothing in this title limits the
right of a State ... to use its National Guard or its defense forces... within its borders in
time of peace." Id. (emphasis added). This protection was first added in 1916, when federal-
ization of the Guard first occurred. See National Defense Act of 1916, ch. 134, § 61, 39 Stat.
166, 198; see also Weiner, supra note 4, at 217-18 (discussion of early twentieth century
reforms of militia system).
Federalization occurred because of the disorganization of the various state militias dur-
ing the Spanish-American War. See id. at 193-94. As a result, Congress passed the Dick Act,
which was the first attempt at organization. See Act of Jan. 21, 1903, ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775;
Weiner, supra note 4, at 193-94. Far-sighted framers had predicted the problems incumbent
in relying on an unorganized militia for national defense purposes. See THE FEDERALIST No.
25, supra note 1, at 161-62 (A. Hamilton).
9 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. Under this clause of the Constitution, Congress is
1989]
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ever, in Perpich v. United States Department of Defense,10 the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed a
panel decision" and held that the Montgomery Amendment (the
"Amendment"), 2 which permits the President to send a state's
National Guard (the "Guard") abroad on training missions during
times of peace without the governor's consent, was constitutional.'3
In Perpich, the Governor of Minnesota sued in federal district
court 4 seeking a declaratory judgment that the Montgomery
Amendment was an unconstitutional infringement on the states'
authorized "[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
surpress Insurrections and repel Invasions." Id. Congress has delegated this power to the
executive branch, where the President acts through the governors of the various states. See
10 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988). This power extends to situations where invasion is imminent. Mar-
tin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 29-30 (1827). The power to repel invasion also includes
the power to place the rebellious areas under military governance. See Raymond v. Thomas,
91 U.S. 712, 714-15 (1875). There is some precedent to indicate that the President has no
authority to federalize the militia in order to send it into a foreign country as part of an
army of occupation. See 29 Op. Att'y Gen. 322 (1912).
For a general view of the power of the national government under the militia clauses,
see Hirsch, supra note 6, at 945-46; see also 10 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1988) (Army National
Guard of the United States); id. § 101(13) (1988) (Air National Guard of the United States).
The call-up of the National Guard under the dual system is regulated by statute. Id. § 672
(1988).
10 880 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 715 (Jan. 8, 1990) (No.
89-542). For a similar decision in the First Circuit, see Dukakis v. United States Dep't of
Defense, 686 F. Supp. 30, 38 (D. Mass.) afl'd per curiam, 859 F.2d 1066 (1st Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1743 (1989).
11 See Perpich, 880 F.2d at 14; Perpich v. United States Dep't of Defense, No. 87-5345,
slip op. (8th Cir. Dec. 6, 1988). This panel decision had reversed the decision of the district
court finding the statute constitutional. See Perpich v. United States Dep't of Defense, 666
F. Supp. 1319, 1325 (D. Minn. 1987).
1.2 10 U.S.C. § 672(f) (1988). The Montgomery Amendment (the "Amendment") states:
"The consent of a Governor described in subsections (b) and (d) may not be withheld (in
whole or in part) with regard to active duty outside the United States, its territories, and its
possessions, because of any objection to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of such
active duty." Id. Subsections 672(b) and (d) provide the "federal government with authority
to call state guardsmen to active duty with the consent of their state governors." Perpich,
880 F.2d at 32 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
The Amendment was named for Representative Sonny V. Montgomery of Mississippi,
who proposed the Amendment to a Defense Authorization Bill in response to Maine Gover-
nor Joseph E. Brennan's refusal, under 10 U.S.C. § 672 (1982) to permit a detachment of
the Maine National Guard to participate in a road building exercise in Honduras. See
Kester, supra note 4, at 177-80. The Governor was opposed to the Reagan Administration's
Central American policy. Id. The Amendment was opposed by a long list of governors. Id.
Perpich, 880 F.2d at 14.
' Perpich v. United States Dep't of Defense, 666 F. Supp. 1319 (D. Minn. 1987), rev'd,
No. 87-5345, slip. op. (8th Cir. Dec. 6, 1988), rev'd 880 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc),
cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 715 (1990).
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authority to train the militia.15 The trial court held that the dual-
enlistment system of the present-day National Guard, in which a
soldier joining the Guard automatically becomes a member of both
the state national guard and the National Guard of the United
States, was a valid exercise of congressional power.16 Therefore, the
governor's consent was not required to send the guard on training
missions while in federal service. 7 A divided three judge panel of
the Eighth Circuit reversed,' 8 and held that since the Montgomery
Amendment did not require the President or Congress to declare a
national security emergency before federalizing the National
Guard, it thereby granted the federal government unconstitutional
control over the militia. On rehearing en banc, the Eighth Circuit
vacated the panel decision and affirmed the judgment of the dis-
trict court, holding that the Montgomery Amendment was a con-
stitutional exercise of congressional power.19
Writing for the court, Circuit Judge Magill recognized that the
dual-enlistment system involves conflicting claims of sovereignty
between the states and the national government.20 The court rea-
soned that since the dual-enlistment system is a "necessary and
proper exercise of Congress' army power," it is therefore constitu-
tional.2' However, in framing its inquiry, the court examined
15 Perpich, 880 F.2d at 13. After passage of the Montgomery Amendment, members of
the Minnesota National Guard participated in a Central American training mission during
January of 1987. Id. After the units returned, Governor Perpich objected to the training
mission as violative of his power as commander-in-chief to consent to the deployment of the
Minnesota National Guard and filed suit with the State of Minnesota. See id.
16 Perpich, 666 F. Supp. at 1323.
17 Id. at 1324.
18 Perpich v. United States Dep't of Defense, No. 87-5345, slip op. at 4-5 (8th Cir. Dec.
6, 1988). In addition, the court held that the Amendment contravened the intent of the
framers and violated the plain meaning of the constitution. Id. at 4-5. The court also found
that:
the gubernatorial veto power over federal requests for National Guard troops
when the national security is not threatened, does not impermissibly involve the
states in defense or foreign policy decisions. . . . [T]he government has not
demonstrated that the effectiveness of either the national defense or the National
Guard will be diminished by adherence to the constitutional principle of basic
state control over national guard forces, absent a declaration of war or national
exigency.
Id. at 6.
19 Perpich, 880 F.2d at 14.
25 Id. at 14-16. The decision also presents a capsulized history of the dual enlistment
system. See id.
21 Id. at 16; accord Dukakis v. United States Dep't. of Defense. 686 F. Supp. 30, 38 (D.
Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 859 F.2d 1066 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1743 (1989).
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whether the governor of a state, as the commander-in-chief of the
state's militia, has any veto power when Congress exercises its au-
thority in this area.22 Judge Magill acknowledged that "[t]he au-
thority given to Congress by the army clause is plenary and exclu-
sive."2 3 Therefore, the court concluded that the states have no
constitutional authority to restrain Congress' power to deploy state
national guardsmen under the army clauses.24 Noting that this
analysis alone would have been sufficient to affirm the district
court judgment, Judge Magill nevertheless considered the scope of
the militia clauses because of Governor Perpich's vigorous argu-
ments concerning those clauses.25 After a brief review of the rele-
vant case law,2" the court concluded that the states' constitutional
control over the militia during times of peace could not serve to
override congressional power under the army clauses.2
In a strong dissent, Senior Circuit Judge Heaney argued that
the Perpich court's decision effectively eliminated the militia
clauses from the Constitution.2 8 The dissent examined the history
The constitutionality of the dual-enlistment system had previously been upheld. See John-
son v. Powell, 414 F.2d 1060, 1064 (5th Cir. 1969); Drifka v. Brainard, 294 F. Supp. 425, 427
(W.D. Wash. 1968). But see Johnson v. Powell, 393 U.S. 920, 920 (1968) (order denying stay
of deployment of members of National Guard). Justice Douglas stated "I am not yet per-
suaded that either the Army or the Solicitor General can play loosely with the concept of
'militia.'" Id.; see also United States v. Peel, 4 M.J. 28, 29 (C.M.A. 1977) (state officials
have sole authority under Constitution to order guardsmen to active duty).




21 Id. at 16-18. The Perpich court relied heavily upon the Selective Draft Law Cases,
245 U.S. 366 (1918). In this decision, the Supreme Court consolidated several draft cases
and addressed the constitutionality of the wartime draft. See id. at 375. The Court held that
"[t]he possession of authority to enact the statute [instituting the draft] must be found in
the clauses of the Consitution giving Congress power 'to declare war; . . . to raise and sup-
port armies... [and] to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces.'" Id. at 377 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8). The Perpich court relied on this analy-
sis indicating that the militia clauses of the Constitution do not interfere with congressional
power to conduct a draft during wartime. Perpich, 880 F.2d at 17; see also Cox v. Wood, 247
U.S. 3, 6 (1918) (explaining holding in Selective Service Draft Cases); infra notes 45-50 and
accompanying text (analysis of sweep of army clauses during both war and peace under
facts of Perpich).
Perpich, 880 F.2d at 17-18.
28 Id. at 18 (Heaney, J., dissenting). "With a few strokes of the word processor, the
majority has written the Militia Clause out of the United States Constitution." Id. Judge
Heaney wrote the prior panel decision. Perpich v. United States Dep't of Defense, No. 87-
5345, slip op. (8th Cir. Dec. 6, 1988).
[Vol. 64:1:133
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of the militia clauses, by looking first to the intent of the-framers"
and then proceeding to the pertinent case law.3" From this case
history analysis, Judge Heaney argued that the militia clauses
placed an important limitation on congressional power by requir-
ing that a state of "national exigency" exist before Congress' army
power can override the power reserved to the states in those
clauses.3' The dissent reviewed the relevant statutes concerning
federalization of the National Guard and argued that before the
Montgomery Amendment, federalization without consent of the
governor could occur only where such a national emergency ex-
isted.32 Based on this analysis 6f the militia clauses, the dissent
concluded that the Montgomery Amendment represented an un-
constitutional infringement on the power reserved to the states.3s
It is submitted that the Eighth Circuit's decision in Perpich
will serve to erode the constitutional role of the states to a point
where they will have virtually no control over the training or gen-
eral administration of the state national guard. Judge Heaney's
dissent, while correct in its conclusion that the Perpich court's
analysis effectively eliminated the militia clauses from the Consti-
tution, failed to address the broader impact of the decision. Alter-
natively, the majority's sweeping interpretation of congressional
20 Perpich, 880 F.2d at 19-22 (Heaney, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that the
framers perceived the militia clause as an important and necessary limitation on the power
of the national government. Id. "Strange as it may now seem, the Framers feared that if the
militia did not exist to protect state interests, the army might be used by the federal govern-
ment to oppress the states and their citizens." Id. at 24 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 26-31 (Heaney, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that "[n]either of the cases
[Selective Draft Law Cases and Cox] supports the majority's opinion" because there the
Supreme Court declared that "in war the federal government can use all its military powers
combined to supersede the states' reserved authority over the militia." Id. at 27 (Heaney, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). Since Perpich did not involve wartime, by negative implica-
tion, the states' reserved authority over the militia was not superseded. Id. at 30-31 (He-
aney, J., dissenting); see infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (discussion of impact of
wartime on congressional power under army clauses).
31 Perpich, 880 F.2d at 30 (Heaney, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that "before the
legislative or executive branch can use the authority of the Army Clause to overcome re-
served state authority over the National Guard, Congress or the President must first affirm-
atively assert the existence of a national exigency or of a specific threat to the national
security." Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
32 Id. at 31-35 (Heaney, J., dissenting). "From time to time over the past 200 years, the
Congress of the United States has taken steps to improve the effectiveness of the National
Guard. Until 1986, however, it always recognized the restraints of the Militia Clauses of the
United States Constitution." Id. at 35 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
33 Id. at 39 (Heaney, J., dissenting). This argument was further supported by a detailed
policy analysis of the need for and the efficacy of the statute. Id. at 35-39.
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power under the army clauses will serve to place severe limitations
on the concept of federalism. This Comment will suggest that the
Montgomery Amendment violates the limitations placed on federal
legislative power through the Bill of Rights and concepts of feder-
alism, and, in turn, will assert that the Perpich court erred in up-
holding the constitutionality of the Amendment.
I. LIMITATIONS ON CONGRESSIONAL POWER
The United States' constitutional scheme of government pro-
vides two types of limitations on the enumerated article I powers
of Congress. 4 The first category is internal limitations, those re-
strictions that are inherent in the granting of the enumerated
power.3 5 Because of the great deference the judiciary has granted
Congress, particularly with respect to the commerce clause,3 6 inter-
nal limitations on congressional power have gone largely unen-
forced. The power of Congress has not gone unchecked, however,
for the courts have used the second category, external limitations,3 8
" The enumerated article I powers are those delegated to Congress by the United
States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. These powers include the power Congress
possesses under the army clauses. See id. at cls. 15-16; supra notes 6-7.
'5 L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 5.1, at 297. Such internal limitations can be found among
the enumerated powers themselves. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 1 (congressional
exercise of taxing power must be uniform throughout the states); id. at cl. 12 (congressional
power to raise and support armies subject to appropriations limit of two years); id. at cl. 3
(congressional commerce clause power limited to regulation of foreign commerce and com-
merce among the several states).
' See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 5.8, at 316 ("Contemporary commerce clause doctrine
grants Congress such broad power that judicial review of the affirmative authorization for
congressional action is largely a formality"). The Supreme Court has generally deferred to
the judgment of Congress when determining whether a congressional action falls within the
scope of the commerce power. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 258-59 (1964) (Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964, designed to prevent racial discrimi-
nation in public places, falls within congressional power under commerce clause); United
States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942) (commerce clause allows congres-
sional regulation of marketing and production of milk sold intrastate because of competition
with interstate commerce); see also supra note 3 (describing shift toward more expansive
view of commerce clause).
" See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 5.8, at 316. With respect to the commerce clause, the
Supreme Court has adopted the "cumulative effect" principle, whereby individual transac-
tions which, when examined alone, are too minor to have any impact on interstate com-
merce are aggregated to show such an impact. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28
(1942). This type of concession is indicative of the Court's abandonment of internal con-
trols. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 5.5, at 310.
" The term "external limitations" will be used to denote those limitations on congres-
sional power which are not included within the enumerated grants of powers.
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to temper congressional power.39 External limitations on congres-
sional power include the separation of powers doctrine,40 article I
restrictions,4 the Bill of Rights,42 and the concept of federalism.43
A. Internal Limitations
The Perpich court analyzed the constitutionality of the Mont-
gomery Amendment by examining solely the internal limitations
created by the militia clauses.44 This analysis was flawed because
of its failure to consider the expanding and contracting nature of
congressional war power .4 The war powers of the national govern-
ment, which include those powers enumerated in the Constitu-
tion46 as well as those derived from powers which all sovereign na-
39 The limitations imposed can be seen quite clearly in those amendments which impli-
cate federalism concerns. See, e.g., Employees of Department of Pub. Health & Welfare v.
Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285-86 (1973) (eleventh amendment
limits congressional action under Fair Labor Standards Act); see also Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 201-02 (1970) (tenth amendment precludes congressional regulation of state
elections).
40 See 1 SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 3, § 3.12, at 249-52. Under the separa-
tion of powers doctrine, Congress cannot overstep its bounds and perform tasks which are
more pertinent to the executive or judicial branches. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
733-34 (1986) (portions of Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
(Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act) allowing legislative officer to perform executive branch
functions held unconstitutional); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952-59 (1983) (single house
legislative veto held unconstitutional as violative of division of power between legislative
and executive branches); see ilso Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 658-61 (1989)
(analysis of division of powers between legislature and judiciary).
41 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. Article I restrictions on congressional power include limi-
tations on the suspension of habeas corpus, issuance of bills of attainder, and enactment of
ex post facto laws; taxes must be proportional to the census; no preference is to be given to
the commerce of a particular state; and expenditures must be made in accordance with a
statement of account procedure. Id.; see J. KING, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AND TRUE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 377-84 (1985) (discussion of article I limita-
tions on congressional power).
42 U.S. CONsT. amends. I-X. The Bill of Rights was considered necessary to supplement
the separation of powers in order to protect individual liberty. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, §
1.2, at 4.
43 See Lieberman, Modern Federalism: Altered States, 20 URB. LAW. 285, 286 (1988).
Federalism creates a "dynamic tension" between the state and federal governments. Id.
", Perpich, 880 F.2d at 17.
45 In analyzing the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918), the Perpich court
made no distinction between the wartime circumstances of 1918 and peacetime circum-
stances of 1988-89. See Perpich, 880 F.2d at 16.
41 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-14 (the army clauses); id. at art. I, § 8, cls. 15-16
(militia clauses); id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (the power of the President as the Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces).
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tions inherently possess,47 are utilized to their fullest only when
the circumstances require.48 As a result, the breadth of the powers
of the national government will be greatest when a state of war or
similar emergency exists.49 At that point, the limitations on con-
gressional power become de minimus at best.5 0
The case law relied on by the court in Perpich was based on
the existence of a state of war, whether de jure or de facto." In
17 See 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 60-62. The grant of war power to Congress is
both specifically and impliedly authorized. Id. The concept of inherent war powers comes
from the "necessary and proper" clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The inherent war
powers are not dependent on affirmative grants of power but rather are based on the na-
tion's existence as a sovereign state. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 318 (1936). These powers include the power to wage war, maintain diplomatic
relations, and enter treaties and collective security agreements. Id. Because states do not
possess inherent war power, federalism limitations on national power would not impede con-
gressional exercise of this power during war. See id. at 316. See generally Lofgren, United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1,
3-5 (1973) (federal powers in foreign affairs are independent of state power).
48 L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 5.16, at 353-55. As Professor Tribe has explained:
The Supreme Court has held that these war powers, in conjunction with the nec-
essary and proper clause, grant Congress authority to take actions in wartime
which would be unconstitutional in peacetime. Such congressional action may
both assume responsibilities ordinarily left to the states and restrict the scope of
private rights.
Id. at 353.
This expansion can best be seen through wartime economic regulation. See Woods v.
Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 141 (1948) (Congress' extensive power over economic
regulation during wartime justifies rent control until emergency has ended); Hamilton v.
Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 168 (1919) (wartime prohibition justi-
fied and may continue until demobilization and reason for emergency has ceased); see also 1
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 3, § 6.11, at 406 ("Because the power to wage war is
the power to wage it successfully, the context of a war or preparations for a war or its
winding down may justify extensive legislative and executive power"). See generally W.
REVELLEY, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY 83-125 (F. Wilcox & R.
Frank eds. 1976) (extensive discussion of nature of war power under Constitution).
'9 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). "When a nation is at war many
things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to [the war] effort that their
utterance will not be endured . . . [and] no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right." Id. During the Vietnam War, an argument was presented that Con-
gress could not exercise war powers because no formal state of war existed. See Holmes v.
United States, 391 U.S. 937-39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (denying certiorari).
50 See Rostow, The Japanese-American Cases: A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 passim
(1945); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 5.16, at 355 (illustrates wartime expansion of
power that may infringe on individual liberties).
81 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (Vietnam); Cox v. Wood,
247 U.S. 3, 6 (1918) (World War I); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 383 (1918)
(World War I); Johnson v. Powell, 414 F.2d 1060, 1063 (5th Cir. 1969) (Vietnam); Drifka v.
Brainard, 294 F. Supp. 425, 427 (W.D. Wash. 1968) (Vietnam). While Vietnam was not a
declared war, attention is called to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, wherein Congress de-
clared that an emergency situation existed. Joint Res. of Aug. 10, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408,
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Perpich, however, no such situation existed. 52 Therefore, it is sub-
mitted that the Perpich court's analysis, based on a broad reading
of the powers of the national government under the army clauses,
must fail. When there is no state of war or similar emergency, the
army clauses should not be given such a wide interpretation and,




A constitutional analysis based on the external limitations of
congressional power would have revealed to the Perpich court that
the Montgomery Amendment was an impermissible extension of
congressional power. The doctrine of external limitations on con-
gressional action has been derived from related concepts of feder-
alism 54 and state sovereignty.5 5 Under this doctrine, there are cer-
tain components of the Constitution, outside the enumerated
powers of Congress, which, when taken together, limit the national
government's power to intrude into state activities and institu-
tions.5 6 It is submitted that this doctrine, which the Supreme
Court is employing with increasing frequency to resolve issues of
federal-state relations, should have been applied by the Perpich
78 Stat. 384 (1964).
512 Perpich, 880 F.2d at 13 (federal activation of state National Guard for peacetime
training).
11 Cf. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 88 (1921) (wartime does not
suspend fifth and sixth amendments); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866)
(post-war exercise of war powers that infringe on civil liberties will be struck down); L.
TRIBE, supra note 3, § 5.16, at 355 (role of judiciary to restrain congressional power during
peacetime).
N See supra note 1. Federalism refers to the shared power relationship between the
states and the national government. See B.-SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 37-40 (1972).
"5 See 1 SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 3, § 3.6, at 221-22. State sovereignty is
the concept that each state has control over its own affairs, subject to the federal scheme of
government. Id. at 222.
51 See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379-80 (1976) (principles of federalism, em-
bodied primarily in eleventh amendment, prevent federal judiciary from ordering structural
changes in local police administration based on violation of constitutional rights, absent
high degree of official involvement); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (concerns
of federalism prevent federal judiciary from ordering damages paid out of state treasury);
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971) (federal courts generally precluded by federal-
ism from enjoining state criminal prosecutions); see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,
269 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting) (states retain significant amount of sovereign authority in
federal system); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("constitution of the United
States ... recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the states"). The
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The constitutional components of this doctrine are derived
from the guarantee clause,55 the enumerated powers contained in
article 1,59 and the tenth amendment.60 These components, when
considered together, place limitations on the power of the national
government.61 Specifically, through these components, a state, as
an independent entity within our scheme of government, is consti-
tutionally protected.2 This protected status has caused the courts
to develop certain methods of analysis to ensure that state sover-
eignty is preserved.6
1. Bill of Rights
The first method of analysis employed is an examination of
the Bill of Rights.6 4 Facially, the second amendment6 5 appears to
be implicated. The Supreme Court, in considering challenges to
handgun control measures, 6 has developed an analysis which rec-
external limitation analysis has also been used frequently in cases where the Supreme Court
ultimately decides that federal intervention is warranted. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985); United Transp. Union v. Long Island
R.R. 455 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981).
58 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. "The United States shall guarantee to every State ... a
Republican Form of Government." Id.
" Id. at art. I, § 8.
'0 Id. at amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people").
"1 See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 5.20, at 378-85. "Congressional action which treats the
states in a manner inconsistent with their constitutionally recognized independent status
[is] contrary to the structural assumptions ... of the Constitution as a whole." Id. at 379.
2 See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) ("Congress may not exercise
power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in
a federal system"); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868) ("there [is] no loss of
[the] seperate and independent autonomy [of] the states, through their union under the
Constitution").
11 See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 5.20, at 383-84 ("The Supreme Court has used a num-
ber of devices to ensure state sovereignty, such as the clear statement rule, the anti-discrim-
ination rule, and looked for structural evidence of the operation of politcal safeguards").
4 See id. ("The exercise by Congress of power ancillary to an enumerated.., authority
is constitutionally valid so long as ... [it] does not conflict with external limitations such as
those of the Bill of Rights and of federalism").
8" See U.S. CONST. amend. II. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." Id.
88 See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (congressional ban on owner-
ship by convicted felon of any firearm which has been in interstate commerce held constitu-
tional); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (congressional control of handguns
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ognizes that the primary purpose of the amendment, as intended
by the framers, is to prevent federal interference with the militia."7
It is submitted, therefore, that the second amendment places an
external limit on congressional control over the militia which was
not considered by the Perpich court.
2. Federalism and State Sovereignty Analysis
Federalism and state sovereignty, as external limitations on
congressional power,"" present two theories of analysis. The first
theory, based largely on the commerce clause, but equally applica-
ble to Congress' other article I powers, ensures that the states are
adequately represented in the political process when the possibilty
of infringement on state sovereignty occurs.6 9 Legislation such as
the Montgomery Amendment would be valid only if it delegated
responsibility for the administration of the legislation to an entity
capable of preserving the interests of the states. 70 It is submitted
that the Perpich court should have employed this test and con-
cluded that the Montgomery Amendment failed because the Presi-
dent, through the Department of Defense, makes all pertinent de-
cisions regarding the training of the National Guard, and, as a
result, precludes the adequate representation of the states in the
decision-making process. The second component of the first
does not implicate second amendment concerns); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886)
(state firearm control laws do not implicate second amendment); United States v. Cruik-
shank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (second amendment does not apply to municipal legislation
controlling private ownership of handguns).
17 See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 ("[absent] any evidence tending to show that possession.
[of a handgun] has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of well
regulated militia, we cannot say that the second amendment [is implicated]"). See generally
Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL.
1 (1987) (discussion of framers intent in drafting second amendment).
68 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
19 See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 543 (1954).
The federal system, through its political safeguards, insures that state interests will be taken
into account in legislative decisions. Id. at 558. This is done through several constitutional
devices. Id. at 543. First, the Constitution ensures that the states remain separate entities.
Id. Second, the Constitution bestows upon the states a significant role in the appointment of
a central administration. Id. Finally, the Consitution delegates powers between the nation
and several states. Id.
70 L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 5.20, at 384 (for such legislation to be valid there must be
structural evidence that states were adequately represented in any legislation that signifi-
cantly burdens state governmental activity); see also Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the
Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1871 (1976).
1989]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
method of analysis is a "less drastic means" mode of scrutiny."1
The Perpich court failed to recognize that the Montgomery
Amendment would not pass scrutiny under this test because con-
trol over the training of the Guard could be acheived through more
traditional and less imposing means.
The second theory of analysis concerns the concept that the
Constitution is based on the structural assumptions of state sover-
eignty and federalism, a notion supported by the component parts
of the Constitution mentioned above. Under this analysis, any con-
gressional action which denies a state its independent status in the
federal system is void. 2 It is submitted that the Montgomery
Amendment denies states a fundamental precept of their indepen-
dent status-control over the militia. The Constitution recognizes
a militia that will be under the general control of the states,73 and
this institution is an important element of state sovereignty. 4 The
Perpich court's refusal to recognize Minnesota's control over this
institution seriously infringes on the sovereignty of the states.
II. CONCLUSION
When reference is made to the various external limitations im-
posed upon Congress' article I powers it becomes apparent that the
court in Perpich was incorrect in holding the Montgomery Amend-
ment constitutional. While on a public policy level the Montgom-
ery Amendment may appear to be desirable so that the national
government can have a coherent and responsive foreign policy, its
danger of straining the delicate balance between the states and the
federal government far outweigh the public policy concerns. The
framers of the United States Constitution intended a government
71 L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 5.21 at 384 (there must be evidence that "state interests
were fully heard and reasonably weighed").
72 See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911). In Coyle, the Supreme Court reviewed
a law passed by Congress which admitted Oklahoma into the Union as the 48th state, pro-
vided that the capital was moved to Oklahoma City. Id. at 564-65. The Coyle Court held
that as a sovereign state, Oklahoma could not be forced to give up a fundamental tenet of
its independence, the right to choose a capital. Id. at 579. Similarly, the Supreme Court has
refused to become a court of last resort in decisions based on state common law. See Mur-
doch v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 633 (1874). The Court has recognized that
congressional power under the army clause is as broad in scope as that of the commerce
clause. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 436 (1956).
71 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
71 See id.
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that was truly federal and, as such, this system should be
preserved.
Roy W. Breitenbach
